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Aftershock: Reflections on the Politics of Reconstruction 
in Northern Gorkha
Many commentators have described 
the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake in 
Nepal either (1) through the notion that 
‘nothing is going on’ in regards to post-
quake reconstruction; or (2) through a 
celebration of grassroots resilience and urban 
entrepreneurship in the face of disaster 
and state neglect. In this article, I draw on 
observations from Kutang and Nubri in the 
mountains of northern Gorkha District to 
argue that neither of these descriptions is fully 
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible 
area, much was being done in the aftermath 
of disaster, and a great deal of this activity 
diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions 
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often 
associated with ‘resilience.’ 
I describe the fraught politics involved in 
distributing relief aid in a village where the local 
government has been non-existent for years; 
the active positioning of new political players on 
the local scene; and the economic inequalities 
that can arise from unlucky positioning along 
geological fault-lines, a recently booming 
tourist economy, and the specificities of 
the Nepali government’s post-disaster 
compensation schemes. This article sketches 
out the anatomy of disaster ‘aftershock’ as a 
political environment rife with opportunity, 
bias, and unintended consequences. As scholars 
and interested observers of Nepal and the 
Himalaya, we need to pay close attention to 
this environment and its potentially unequal 
outcomes that reverberate past this present 
moment of taking stock.
Keywords: Nepal, earthquake, aftershock, reconstruction, 
politics.
Rune Bennike
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Introduction
On April 25th 2015, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the 
Richter Scale shook the Himalaya. Over the following 
months, the initial quake was followed by a range of 
aftershocks that seemed never-ending, and which kept 
many inhabitants of the region in a drawn-out state of 
terror. Soon after the initial quake, international donors 
pledged over $4 billion to be used for post-earthquake 
reconstruction to the Nepalese government. Nonetheless, 
‘reconstruction’ in the aftermath of this disaster has 
extensively been characterized by notions of slowness and 
inactivity. It took the government almost a year to begin 
disbursing reconstruction funds in earnest; in fact, the dis-
tribution is still ongoing at the time of writing this article 
(June 2017)—two years after the funds were pledged. In 
the absence of swift action on the side of the government, 
many commentators—journalists and academics alike—
describe the aftermath of the earthquake as either a state 
of inactivity or a stage for grassroots resilience in the 
face of disaster and state neglect. In this article, I draw on 
observations from Kutang and Nubri, located in the moun-
tains of northern Gorkha District1 (a mere 30 kilometers, 
or 19 miles, from the epicenter of the first major earth-
quake) to argue that neither of these descriptions is fully 
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible area, a great 
deal was going on in the aftermath of disaster, and much 
of this activity diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions 
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often associated 
with ‘resilience.’
This article explores the anatomy of ‘aftershock’—as a 
social and political phenomenon rather than a seismic one. 
In the wake of disaster, as relief aid and reconstruction 
funding has poured into Nepal, a multitude of political and 
economic, as well as personal and social, transformations 
are taking place. Following disasters in other times and 
places, people often refer to this ‘aftershock’ as a ‘second 
earthquake’ or a ‘tsunami after the tsunami.’ As such 
expressions indicate, the magnitude of these post-disaster 
changes is easily perceived as being on par with that of 
the disaster itself. The aftershock speeds up, intensifies 
and—sometimes—alters the existing social structures and 
processes of change. To give one obvious example, after 
seven years of political deadlock, the aftershock environ-
ment facilitated the making of a new, and controversial, 
constitution for Nepal. This article addresses some of the 
dynamics taking place in the aftershock through a range of 
both firsthand observations and analyses of ongoing public 
debates. As I illustrate, these dynamics move things around 
in less predictable ways than what mainstream narratives 
of post-disaster reconstruction tend to suggest.
While ‘Nothing is Going On’: Public Debate and 
Mainstream Approaches to Post-Disaster
Dominant discourses about disaster allows us to 
believe that we understand what has happened 
and what is to be done. Such intellectual and 
moral entrapment obscures much of what actu-
ally takes place in the name of reconstruction. 
(Simpson 2013: 267)
As one might expect, the earthquake sparked a lot of 
debate among Nepal anthropologists—readers of this 
journal—as well as other engaged intellectuals and jour-
nalists. Much of the debate was highly sensitive to the 
complex processes that were continuously unfolding. We 
were reminded of the fact that the earthquake was also 
a ‘class-quake,’ generally hitting the poor (such as the 
migrant workers living in unsafe hostels near the Gongabu 
bus park in the northwestern outskirts of Kathmandu) 
harder than the rich. We were also reminded of the various 
sources and forms of resilience displayed in the aftermath 
of disaster; the potential pitfalls in celebrating resilience in 
the face of government neglect; and the difficult balancing 
act involved in choosing whether to work with or around 
the government in relief and reconstruction (Nelson 2015; 
Leve 2015; Sander et al. 2015; Tamang 2015). 
Despite these sensitivities, parts of the debate seemed 
distinctly at odds with what I was seeing take place in 
northern Gorkha. One of the things I found most strik-
ing was the persistent narrative that nothing, really, 
was going on in Nepal in terms of reconstruction. For 
instance, at the South Asia Conference at the University 
of Wisconsin—Madison in October 2015 participants in 
a roundtable discussion on the earthquake kept repeat-
ing the same laments that were prevalent in Nepali and 
international news media that none of the over $4 billion 
that international donors pledged to the Nepali state for 
post-earthquake reconstruction had yet been distrib-
uted. While this was certainly true at the time and highly 
problematic, many people seemed to equate this inactivity 
on the side of formal, state-led reconstruction with a total 
lack of reconstruction. Due to the very tangible, infrastruc-
tural challenges involved in getting assistance into the 
area, northern Gorkha was often described as a place ‘not 
yet reached’ by aid. There was some truth to this claim, of 
course. The mountainous environment did provide major 
obstacles to the distribution of relief materials. However, 
this condition did not equate with inactivity and the lack 
of reconstruction. In fact, in an area where the presence 
of the state has always been rather thin, a combination 
of local initiative and transnational non-state networks 
had immediately been mobilized to raise funds for relief 
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and reconstruction outside the ambit of formal initiatives 
led by government and international relief organizations. 
Here, the reconstruction of houses was well underway 
within weeks of the first quake. 
The tendency to describe places like northern Gorkha in 
terms of their inactivity—despite such reconstruction 
initiatives—is telling. First, the diagnosis resonates eerily 
with prevalent narratives that characterize the high 
Himalaya in terms of its remoteness and developmental 
backwardness (Hussain 2015; Pigg 1992). Second, it fits well 
with mainstream approaches to post-disaster reconstruc-
tion that tend to operate on the basis of a simple cause 
and effect relationship.2 This approach is clearly reflected 
in the now globally standardized formats of the Post 
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) framework.3 Here, the 
earthquake is the cause and its effects are summarized in 
terms of ‘damages’ and ‘economic losses’ (GoN 2015). With 
this simple formula, the effects of the 2015 Himalayan 
earthquake can be counted and evaluated on exactly the 
same basis as the Haiti earthquake or the Pakistan floods. 
The framework of this formula thus speaks to a tabula rasa 
imagination of disaster, where disasters wipe clean the 
slate of society so that post-disaster interventions can 
be planned in the same way whether they are operating 
in the high Himalaya of Nepal or the Caribbean island of 
Haiti. In fact, many of the international specialists who 
began to stream into Nepal after the quake seemed to 
be selected for the job specifically because of their past 
experience in Haiti.
As in other post-disaster situations (Simpson and Serafini 
2015: 17), the Nepal PDNA was an extremely rough and 
hasty product. For instance, a friend and I were suddenly 
invited into the World Bank office to comment on their 
estimates for damage to the tourism sector based on our 
severely limited experience working in Gorkha after the 
earthquake. There were only a few days to the deadline 
and the Bank needed to come up with some figures. The 
ministries and international agencies involved in the PDNA 
obviously did whatever they could to get the most accurate 
estimates, but given the chaos of the aftermath and the 
haste of the exercise (the PDNA needed to be incorporated 
into an overdue financial bill to be passed by parliament), 
the results seemed close to guesswork. Nevertheless, as 
soon as the PDNA was released, it assumed the appearance 
of a total analysis. In Simpson’s words, it ‘allows us to 
believe that we understand what has happened and what 
is to be done’ (Simpson 2013: 267, see also Simpson and 
Serafini 2015). Hence, while the PDNA and mainstream 
cause-and-effect approaches provide a convenient baseline 
for the international relief industry, they obscure a good 
deal of what is actually going on. 
As a consequence, a multitude of less formalized initia-
tives, such as those in northern Gorkha, tend to either 
disappear from view or, if they appear, be read through 
the lens of grassroots resilience. However, as this article 
describes, such initiatives do have consequences, and there 
is a lot more to reconstruction and compensation than the 
reestablishment of a status quo ex-ante or ‘building back 
better’ than mainstream approaches to disaster relief seem 
to indicate.4 What I suggest is that the aftershock moves 
things around in much less predictable ways than what 
is imagined here. Disasters do not provide clean slates. 
They are substantially shaped in the image of the societ-
ies they impact. The aftershock interacts with past power 
structures, but it does not necessarily replicate them in a 
one-to-one fashion. Novel opportunities for fundraising 
and the increasing inflow of resources following disaster 
accelerates and intensifies ongoing processes of change 
and may heighten the stakes of how political games play 
out in existing social structures. In the aftershock, oppor-
tunities and misfortunes are created in a shifting playing 
field of complex negotiations of position. The aftershock, 
in other words, shakes things up in ways that cannot be 
adequately articulated through mainstream notions of 
disaster assessments, reconstruction or compensation.
A Note on Positionality
My starting point for writing this article is personal. It 
had never crossed my mind that I would, suddenly, be 
reflecting on disaster and doing research on post-disas-
ter transformation. But I was in Kathmandu when the 
earthquake hit. The stories that I tell in this article stem 
from my experience of post-disaster from this highly-en-
gaged position. Like many others, it took me a few days to 
get my bearings, as I was thoroughly shaken and scared, 
like everyone else. I needed to figure out what had hap-
pened and what was going on. Once my fears subsided, 
I contacted some friends from my ongoing research on 
tourism development in northern Gorkha. They were in 
Kathmandu, and were already in full swing, calling friends 
and relatives. In some places phone connections were 
gone, in other places they had never been established, 
but here and there, my friends were able to receive news 
from the area. Working out of Sonam’s trekking agency, 
we began collecting information more systematically. 
Over the following six weeks, we worked closely together. 
Realizing we had the best information about this remote 
area available at the time, we created online spreadsheets 
with organized and updated information about the seven 
Village Development Committees (VDC) in the Manaslu 
Conservation Area (MCA). Through our connections in 
the area we tried to match local needs with the inflow of 
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aid, and when the major relief organization finally came 
up to speed, almost a month after the first earthquake, we 
handed over as much information as we possibly could.
What we are dealing with here is participant-observation 
with a clear emphasis on participation. My academic reflec-
tions have mostly come later, after I returned from Nepal. 
Since I left the country in early July 2015, I have been back 
twice: for a two-week visit in January 2016 and a six-week 
stay in November-December 2016. These visits have been 
enlightening for the glimpses they have given me of the 
aftershock as a continuously unfolding reality. In January 
2015, Nepal’s new contentious constitution was passed, and 
the country was still in the grip of the fuel blockade that 
followed its promulgation. In November and December of 
2015 public debate was filled with discussions about ‘tin 
lakh’—the Nepal Reconstruction Authority’s promise to 
provide Nrs. 300,000 to each household whose house was 
fully damaged during the earthquake. 
Each visit gave me a new perspective on what the 
aftershock of disaster means. In my mind, however, the 
aftershock remains confusing. I feel that what I’m writing 
now might be countered, again, in a month or two; that 
the aftershock continues its churning that creates new 
forms of political potentiality past the present moment 
of stocktaking. Thus, what I write here is more a critique 
of false certainties and clear-cut causalities than an 
assertion of a new argument set in stone. What I empha-
size is the fluidity of the aftershock as a transformative 
political-economic environment. 
Relief and the Politics of Distribution: ‘It’s All Logistics’5
Disasters are made to appear as logistical problems 
which demand intervention and legitimate tres-
pass. (Simpson 2013: 266)
Post-disaster environments can produce a resource 
bubble where the ‘need to spend’ and to display efficiency 
to donors may easily override concerns with coordina-
tion, local ownership and genuine needs in the name of 
relief (Stirrat 2006). In northern Gorkha, from early on 
relief efforts were framed largely as a technical matter 
and spoken about in terms of terrain, infrastructure and 
the possible ‘throughput’ of resources. While these were 
obvious and legitimate issues in a Himalayan environ-
ment, they largely overshadowed other social and political 
concerns among many of the responding actors. Although 
the past half century of Nepali history vividly attests to 
the fact that ensuring a fair and productive distribution of 
foreign development resources is a massive challenge rife 
with the potential for persistent unintended consequences 
(Pigg 1992; 1993; Bista 1991; Fujikura 2001; Bennike 2015b), 
in the aftershock of disaster all concerns with the issues of 
‘giving’ seemed suddenly to have been swept away.6 The 
urgency and moral imperatives of post-disaster human-
ism superimposed flat, universal notions of suffering (and 
resilience) onto a political and social landscape that was, if 
anything, even more complicated than before the quake. 
Some twelve days after the first quake struck the 
Himalaya, my friend Nyima had raised funds from a group 
of German donors to bring relief materials to Bihi VDC and 
to further assess the situation in the area. Bihi had never 
been connected to the mobile phone networks, which span 
most of the Budhi Gandaki river valley, and information 
about the area’s state was sparse in Kathmandu. Hence, we 
didn’t know what to expect as we boarded the helicopter 
for Bihi, which was also Nyima’s home. The following six 
days in the area were incredible instructive. We learned 
a great deal about the discrepancies between the needs 
of the area and the general post-disaster discourse in 
Kathmandu, and about the fraught interface between relief 
distribution and contentious local politics.7
At the time, tin roofing and the construction of semi-per-
manent housing was the main focus for most responding 
relief agencies. References to the haunting images of 
disaster victims in Haiti and elsewhere, living under 
tattered tarps years after previous disasters, fueled this 
discourse, and the upcoming monsoon provided a clear 
sense of urgency. However, this articulation of ‘local needs’ 
was distinctly at odds with realities in northern Gorkha. 
Constructed of local materials, wood and stacked stones 
without mortar, the houses here were quickly rebuilt 
through local initiatives. Little outside support was needed 
for these rebuilding projects. Every village seemed to 
have someone skilled enough to oversee the reconstruc-
tion. As we arrived in Bihi, a group of about ten men had 
come together and were rebuilding damaged houses at 
the rapid pace of two per day. CGI roofing was welcomed 
as a replacement for worn-out or damaged roofs made 
of wooden planks or slate, but it was not essential. Most 
houses would be fit for habitation before the rains and 
when I returned in 2016 many were indeed improved.
There were other issues, however. Although remote areas 
are often regarded as places of subsistence livelihood, the 
Manaslu area has historically been characterized by a high 
degree of trade and mobility (Childs 2004). As the earth-
quake had provoked a number of major landslides, the 
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trail that provides the lifeline to the area had been broken. 
Foods usually brought from the bazaar in Arughat, which 
is a three-day walk downstream, were in short supply. For 
a while, people had stores of local foods (e.g. corn, barley, 
millet, potatoes) on which to survive, but their stocks 
of rice, lentils, salt, tea, and milk powder were quickly 
depleted. Everything coming into the area had to be trans-
ported by helicopter, a process that was both costly and 
inefficient. Hence, the priority for people in the area was 
not the usual relief materials, but was in fact the reopening 
of the trail.
The distribution of the relief materials that did trickle 
into Bihi, loaded into small helicopters was a complicated 
political affair. With local elections suspended for almost 
two decades, no formally legitimate local bodies existed to 
which to turn. In this vacuum, a local leader and former 
VDC head had, it was persistently rumored, made Bihi into 
his own little fiefdom, ‘eating’ development funding chan-
neled through the state administration and controlling 
local politics with a heavy hand. However, at the time of 
the earthquake, he was hospitalized in Kathmandu and 
thus out of touch with what was going on in Bihi. With no 
formal structures of authority in place and the old leader 
out of the village, the distribution of external resources for 
relief called for local institutional innovation. 
When we arrived, an ad hoc group of Bihi locals had 
emerged to take charge. Formed partly by people opposed 
to the old rule in the village, this group was something 
new. For them, it seemed, the aftershock of the earthquake 
provided an opportunity to show themselves as people 
committed to the common good of the village. They threw 
themselves with great energy at the complicated task of 
fairly distributing meager rations of rice, lentils, biscuits, 
noodles and tarps. The questions facing them, however, 
were many and highly political. Were the materials to be 
distributed uniformly across the local residents or on the 
basis of their needs? Should households or individuals 
be the basic unit for distribution? When was the right 
time to begin distribution? And how could a fair distri-
bution be ensured when resources arrived piecemeal, in 
different localities across the VDC, and often without any 
prior notice?
On distribution day, the complexity of their task was 
vividly illustrated by a curious scene beginning with the 
familiar humming sound of an approaching helicopter. 
Just as the distribution was about to begin, the helicopter 
swept into the village, blowing dust on the materials that 
were laid out for distribution in front of the village mill. It 
was the World Food Programme (WFP). Through a quick 
succession of questions addressed to the people who had 
gathered around him, the WFP representative ascertained 
what seemed to be a foregone conclusion: that the agency 
would supply large quantities of rice to the households 
in the VDC. Five minutes later, they were gone again, but 
the visit had palpably illustrated how the ever-uncertain 
horizon of future relief arrivals complicated distribution. 
Even though dealing with the influx of relief material 
was a complicated political affair in the village, for the 
WFP it was mainly a logistical matter. As one represen-
tative stated, ‘In Nepal, we are working in some of the 
Figure 1. House under 
reconstruction shortly after the 
first major earthquake. 
(Bennike, 2015)
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most difficult terrain in the world, and the challenge 
will be compounded by the monsoon’ (Dixit 2015). Under 
what became known as Operation Mountain Express, the 
agency made an agreement with the Trekking Agencies 
Association of Nepal and the Nepal Mountaineering 
Association to hire up to 20,000 porters and mules in order 
to ‘repair the damaged trails and transport 4,000 metric 
tons (MT) of food and relief items.’8 The WFP and partners 
approached this operation with clear professionalism; for 
instance, employing a professional film crew to document 
their work9 and producing a ‘subway map’ that specifies 
‘staging areas,’ ‘transportations corridors’ and a ‘through-
put’ measured in metric tons per month (MT/mth). 
Nonetheless, the whole operation was framed exclusively 
as a matter of most efficiently pouring resources into the 
area across an incredibly challenging physical terrain; 
all reflections about the complicated social, political and 
economic landscapes into which these resources were 
inserted seemed wiped away.
Apart from this disregard for the local complexities of 
patronage politics, the operation held the potential for 
unintended economic consequences. As part of the WFP 
operations, the main trail through the Manaslu area was 
surveyed by a Swiss/Nepali team some weeks after the 
earthquake. The geologist’s conclusion was clear: the 
main trail was situated on a fault line in the landscape 
and highly prone to landslides. Subsequently, plans were 
made for an alternative trail into the area that included 
high paths on the other (eastern) side of the Budhi Gandaki 
River. This trail would be much safer, and WFP set to work 
developing the trail to a standard they could use for food 
distribution to the area. However, the choice of shifting 
the trail—which was made with reference to logistics and 
safety and pushed through under the urgency of post-di-
saster relief—held the potential for massive unintended 
consequences in relation to the local economy. As an 
up-and-coming tourist area, the Budhi Gandaki river valley 
has seen rapid investment in tourism infrastructure over 
the past 6-7 years. The realignment of the trail would 
mean that a great deal of people who had spent all their 
savings and taken loans to build tourist lodges on the 
western side of the river in anticipation of a future rise in 
tourism would now be by-passed. And with a government 
compensation scheme purely focused on damaged houses, 
the economic loss of these people was not accounted for. 
For a while, it looked like this would be the consequence, 
but by November 2016, the old trail was back in use. To the 
relief of local small-scale tourism businesses, trekkers and 
locals alike seemed to have deemed the safe, high trail too 
cumbersome to use.
Reconstruction: Opportunities for Good Work
The emotive language of suffering, aid, and rehabil-
itation is generally difficult to argue with head on: 
what could be wrong with ‘good work’? (Simpson 
2013: 266)
The earthquake created new opportunities for fundraising 
and opened up peripheral areas, such as northern Gorkha, 
to a host of new organizations and an increased influx of 
resources. Following the initial focus on logistics and relief, 
the emphasis shifted to reconstruction. While the govern-
Figure 2. Small measures 
of dal handed out on 
distribution day in Bihi. 
(Bennike, 2015)
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ment’s National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) moved 
slowly towards the distribution of reconstruction funds 
they were steeped in political infighting, and other orga-
nizations took the opportunity to scale up their operations 
in northern Gorkha—among these Christian organiza-
tions such as World Vision, Christian Relief Services, 
and Mountain Child. When I visited in November and 
December 2016, the resource influx and need to spend was 
tangible. Christian Relief Services tarps were piled high in 
many houses; World Vision had just completed the distri-
bution of Nrs. 45,000 in cash to each household throughout 
the area; and Mountain Child had established a pre-school 
in Samagaon and were working on the reconstruction of a 
school in Ghap. 
For these organizations, the earthquake had provided a 
major opportunity. As the founder of MC candidly stated in 
an appeal for funding shortly after the earthquake, the sit-
uation provided ‘an unprecedented opportunity to unfold 
God’s pervasive grace upon areas that have only known 
martyrdom in the past (…) now is the time to hoist the flag 
of God’s kingdom at the top of the world.’10 It is hard to 
foresee the consequences of such interweaving between 
the urgencies of disaster reconstruction and Christian 
proselytization among communities of Tibetan Buddhists, 
but judging from other post-disaster contexts, they may be 
both insidious and persistent (Simpson 2013; Simpson and 
Serafini 2015: 16).
The influx of resources provided some local people with 
new opportunities. The organizations that were scaling up 
their operations needed new, local employees. Here, the 
aftershock of disaster sped up existing processes of change. 
Good language skills, especially in English, were already a 
means to mobility among young people before the earth-
quake through employment as trekking guides, etc. After 
the earthquake, many of these young people were now 
offered positions as local ‘coordinators’ or ‘mobilizers’ in 
various reconstruction projects. For some people, it was 
suddenly possible to earn a decent wage for very little 
work11 while staying in the village and only undertaking 
occasional visits to Gorkha or Kathmandu to report or 
participate in ‘training’ events. My friend, Nyima, who had 
travelled with me to Bihi after the earthquake, maintained 
connections to some German donors. Employed by the 
new German-funded ‘Initiative Nepal Kids’ (INK), he is 
now overseeing the construction of a school in Bihi and 
splitting his time between Kathmandu and Bihi. Another 
friend, Tashi, who went with me to Bihi in late 2016, had 
just finished a temporary contract working for WV on 
their cash distribution program. Tashi’s friend, Yeshe, who 
we met en route, was working for a local NGO contracted by 
CRS to do recovery and reconstruction work in the area. 
All trained as trekking guides, these smart young boys had 
found new opportunities in the aftershock.
Back in Bihi, the aftershock had also accelerated exist-
ing infrastructural developments. When I returned in 
November 2016, changes were clearly visible. As many 
locals told me, the village had become ‘bikasi’ (developed) 
in the vary tangible ways that are often emphasized in 
Nepali public discourse: the hydro-power supply that had 
been damaged in the earthquake had been re-established, 
providing a steady supply of power to the village; new 
water taps had been installed in every ward and a toilet 
built for every household; a new, big health post had been 
established; and a school building, as well as a private 
hotel, was under construction; last, but not least, a mobile 
tower had been erected just after the earthquake so that 
this part of the river valley was also, now, connected to 
the outside world via cheap and accessible mobile phones. 
Many of these development projects had been planned 
well before the earthquake, but had suddenly been 
accomplished in the rush of reconstruction work after the 
earthquake. Furthermore, villagers themselves had pri-
vately chosen to utilize some of the cash distributed after 
the earthquake to fly CGI sheets for roofing and toilets 
in by helicopter and some were planning to spend the 
expected government reconstruction funds to build small 
‘home-stay’ houses for future tourist.
The aftershock also reverberated in local politics. One 
villager, rumored to have been associated with the heavy-
handed rule of the past, had emerged as the de-facto 
leader of development initiatives in the village. He told me 
how Bihi used to be regarded as a bad, less developed place 
compared to most other villages in the area. Now, it was 
going to be different. Things were changing in Bihi, and he 
wanted it to be regarded as a ‘model VDC.’ Soon after the 
earthquake when I visited the village with relief materials, 
this individual had been leading the group of villagers that 
went around to rebuild houses. Later, his skills had made 
him a central person for the construction of the school in 
collaboration with INK. He has a good command of Nepali 
(in addition to the local dialects of Tibetan) and had con-
verted to Christianity some years before the earthquake. 
He was now the go-to person in the village for develop-
ment. He was doing ‘good work.’ Some villagers, however, 
were skeptical. The memories of the past were still fresh, 
and they were waiting to see whether this man was as 
good on the ‘inside’ as he expressed on the ‘outside’ at the 
current moment. 
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New opportunities emerged in Kathmandu, too. Sonam, 
out of whose office we began coordinating relief to 
northern Gorkha quickly after the disaster, is now heavily 
involved in reconstruction work. Sometime after the 
earthquake, he registered the relief network we had estab-
lished as a fully-fledged NGO.12 While Sonam was already 
running a successful trekking business before the earth-
quake, the aftershock has placed him in a unique position. 
Educated as an emergency architect from a European 
university, and with extensive experience in activism 
for the protection of cultural heritage in the mountains, 
Sonam has become a crucial figure for reconstruction 
projects in northern Gorkha and beyond. In January 
2016, his office was overseeing the reconstruction of six 
schools and health posts northern Gorkha—some with full 
responsibility, others on a consultancy basis. By November 
2016, several additional projects had been included in 
the portfolio. Sonam is now renting the office across the 
hall from his trekking agency in Boudha for the NGO, and 
overhead funds from the various projects have allowed 
him to employ several friends as well as a few volunteer 
interns. Throughout his work, Sonam has been struggling 
against a persistent bias on the side of the government 
to think of reconstruction solely in terms of reinforced 
concrete buildings, (much like in post-earthquake Gujarat, 
see Simpson and Serafini 2015). His design for the school in 
Bihi is now presented as a model for earthquake resistant 
reconstruction with local materials, but there were many 
bureaucratic hassles to get there.
Reverberations
The small fragments of post-disaster experience described 
in this article provide a glimpse into ‘aftershock’ as a 
continuously evolving scenario. Far from the clear-cut 
notions of cause and effect so fundamental to post-disaster 
response, the aftershock is rife with opportunity, bias and 
unintended consequences. As the aftershock continues to 
reverberate in the political, economic and social fabrics 
of Nepali society, no strict conclusions can be drawn from 
the present moment. What is evident, however, is that 
a whole lot of different things take place ‘in the name of 
reconstruction’ (Simpson 2013: 267)—even when the state 
ostensibly does nothing. As the moral imperatives of disas-
ter encourages a major inflow of resources to towns and 
villages across the Himalaya, local politics are infused with 
new stakes. Opportunities arise for those who happen to 
be in the right position or manage to seek that position in 
the aftermath. Others might be bypassed by the new trails 
of development or fall between the cracks of compensation 
schemes. Disparate factors such as religion, occupation, 
education, language skills and social networks—even local-
ity during an earthquake—can affect this. As scholars and 
interested observers of Nepal and the Himalaya, we need 
to pay close attention to these processes and their poten-
tially unequal outcomes in the years to come.
In high Himalayan places such as northern Gorkha District, 
the aftershock of disaster is interacting with existing 
processes of change in multiple, open-ended ways. As 
many other ‘poor’ countries across the world, in the past 
years Nepal has been betting heavily on tourism as a route 
to economic development (GoN 2009, 2010). However, 
plummeting tourist numbers after the earthquake are 
now highlighting the vulnerability of tourism as a route 
to economic development. Over the past decade, the 
Manaslu circuit in northern Gorkha has been promoted as 
an up-and-coming tourist destination, destined to become 
the ‘next Annapurna.’ Nonetheless, locals currently seem 
hesitant. In 2015, a total of 2,414 international trekkers 
visited the area, down from 5,918 the year before. Will the 
numbers go up again? Furthermore, while infrastructural 
development—roads and dams—were a cornerstone of 
Nepali developmental imaginaries even before the earth-
quake, the aftershock has, if anything, reinforced this 
focus. However, as illustrated by recent years’ develop-
ments in Annapurna, the extension of road networks deep 
into and across the Himalayan range can run counter to 
the promotion of eco-nature and trekking tourism. In the 
meantime, the young people who are currently working 
well-paid jobs in the reconstruction industry may be out of 
work soon again, when the funds dry up and the spotlight 
moves elsewhere. What will be their position when this 
happens?
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Endnotes
1. Under the new federal structure in Nepal, effective from 
March 10, 2017, this area lies under the Tsum-Nubri gaon 
palika within province no. 4. 
2. See e.g. (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Guha-Sapir, Santos, and 
Borde 2013, Hallegatte and Przyluski 2010, Cohen and 
Werker 2008, Mochizuki et al. 2014).
3. <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/pdna.html> 
(accessed on March 13, 2017).
4. <http://www.wcdrr.org/uploads/Reconstructing-after-
disasters-Build-back-better.pdf> (accessed on March 13, 
2017).
5. Title from Nepali Times blog post: <http://nepalitimes.
com/blogs/mycity/2015/06/14/its-all-logistics/> (accessed 
on March 13, 2017).
6. Korf et al. 2010.
7. For a short ethnographic description of relief 
distribution in Bihi see (Bennike 2015a).
8. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/
documents/ep/wfp275230.pdf> (accessed on 13 March, 
2017).
9. <https://vimeo.com/fenomcreative>, <http://www.
nepalbeyondtheclouds.com/> (accessed on March 13, 
2017).
10. The appeal is accessible here <http://www.
betweensermons.com/2015/04/help-for-nepal/ and here 
http://asiaharvest.org/nepal-update-help-is-on-the-way/> 
(both accessed on March 13, 2017).
11. In 2016, I was quoted salaries between Nrs. 25 and 
30,000 for work amounting to an average of one day a 
week.
12. <http://tsumnubri.org/>.
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